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Abstract
In this paper, we study the performance of regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoding in large MISO
broadcast channels with confidential messages (BCC). We obtain a deterministic approximation for the achiev-
able secrecy sum-rate which is almost surely exact as the number of transmit antennas M and the number
of users K grow to infinity in a fixed ratio β = K/M . We derive the optimal regularization parameter ξ
and the optimal network load β that maximize the per-antenna secrecy sum-rate. We then propose a linear
precoder based on RCI and power reduction (RCI-PR) that significantly increases the high-SNR secrecy sum-
rate for 1 < β < 2. Our proposed precoder achieves a per-user secrecy rate which has the same high-SNR
scaling factor as both the following upper bounds: (i) the rate of the optimum RCI precoder without secrecy
requirements, and (ii) the secrecy capacity of a single-user system without interference. Furthermore, we obtain
a deterministic approximation for the secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding in the presence of channel
state information (CSI) error. We also analyze the performance of our proposed RCI-PR precoder with CSI
error, and we determine how the error must scale with the SNR in order to maintain a given rate gap to the
case with perfect CSI.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, broadcast channel, random matrix theory, linear precoding, multi-user systems.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks are becoming more and more pervasive, with users relying on them to transmit
sensitive data. Due to the broadcast nature of the physical medium, every node in the network is a
potential eavesdropper, and securing the transmitted information is critical. Security of wireless com-
munications has traditionally been ensured by network layer key-based cryptography. However, these
schemes may not be suitable in the case of large dynamic wireless networks, since they raise issues like
key distribution and management (for symmetric cryptosystems) and high computational complexity
(for asymmetric cryptosystems). Moreover, these schemes are potentially vulnerable, because they
rely on the unproven assumption that certain mathematical functions are hard to invert [1]. To provide
an additional level of protection and to achieve perfect secrecy, methods exploiting the randomness
inherent in noisy channels, known as physical layer security, have been proposed [2], [3].
Physical layer security has recently become an active area of research [4], [5]. The maximum rate at
which a message can be reliably transmitted to an intended user while the rate of information leakage
at an eavesdropper vanishes asymptotically with the code length, denoted as the secrecy capacity, has
been studied for several network topologies. These include multi-antenna wiretap channels [6] and
multi-receiver wiretap channels [7]. Techniques like artificial noise and adaptive encoding have been
proposed for the case when the eavesdropper’s channel is not known by the transmitter [8]–[11]. The
secrecy capacity of a two-user broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) has also been
studied in [12], where the intended users can act maliciously as eavesdroppers. For a larger BCC with
any number of malicious users, practical linear precoding schemes have been proposed [13]. Although
suboptimal, linear precoding can control the amount of interference and information leakage between
the users of a BCC, thus achieving secrecy with low-complexity implementation [14], [15].
In this paper, we propose a linear precoder based on regularized channel inversion (RCI) for the
multiple-input single-output (MISO) BCC. In the MISO BCC, a base station (BS) equipped with
M antennas simultaneously transmits K independent confidential messages to K spatially dispersed
single-antenna users that potentially eavesdrop on each other. Under this system setup, we carry out a
large-system analysis assuming that both M and K grow large, while their ratio β = K/M is fixed.
This paper directly extends some of the analysis in [16], [17] by requiring the transmitted messages
to be kept confidential. Furthermore, this paper generalizes the results provided in [14], where the
2special case of β = 1 with perfect channel state information (CSI) was considered.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We obtain a deterministic equivalent for the large-system secrecy sum-rate achievable by the RCI
precoder in a MISO BCC. We then derive the optimal regularization parameter ξ that maximizes
the secrecy sum-rate. Numerical results confirm that our analysis is accurate even for finite M .
• We derive a closed-form approximation for the optimal network load β that maximizes the per-
antenna secrecy sum-rate. We find that for β > 1 the RCI precoder performs poorly in the
high-SNR regime. Therefore, we propose a linear precoder based on RCI and power reduction
(RCI-PR) that significantly increases the high-SNR secrecy sum-rate for 1 < β < 2.
• We compare the performance of our proposed RCI-PR precoder to: (i) the sum-rate achieved by
an optimized RCI precoder without secrecy requirements and (ii) the secrecy capacity of a single-
user system. The gaps with these two upper bounds represent the loss caused by the presence of:
(i) secrecy requirements and (ii) interference due to multiple users, respectively. Both analysis
and simulations show that the rate of the proposed precoder has the same high-SNR scaling factor
as the two upper bounds.
• We obtain a deterministic equivalent for the secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding in the
presence of CSI error. We then analyze the performance of our proposed RCI-PR precoder and
determine how the CSI estimation error must scale with the SNR, to maintain a given rate gap to
the case with perfect CSI. We find that in large frequency division duplex (FDD) systems, under
random vector quantization (RVQ), B ≈ M−1
3
ρdB − (M − 1)
[
log2
(√
4b− 3− 1)− 1] feedback
bits per user are sufficient to maintain a gap of log2 b bps/Hz at high SNR.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model and a
secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding. In Section III, we derive a deterministic equivalent
for this secrecy sum-rate, as well as the optimal regularization parameter ξ and network load β. In
Section IV, we propose the RCI-PR precoder, and we study the secrecy sum-rate that it can achieve.
Section V compares the performance of the proposed precoder to two upper bounds, obtained (i) in
the absence of secrecy requirements and (ii) in the absence of interference. In Section VI we study
the case when only imperfect CSI is available at the transmitter. Section VII concludes the paper.
Throughout the paper we use the following notation: bold uppercase (lowercase) letters denote
3matrices (column vectors); (·)T , (·)H , tr{·}, ‖ · ‖, and E[·] denote transpose, conjugate transpose,
trace, Euclidean norm, and expectation, respectively; CN (µ, σ2) denotes circularly symmetric complex-
Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2, and we use the notation [·]+ , max(·, 0).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section we introduce the MISO BCC and the secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding.
A. MISO Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages
We consider the downlink of a narrowband MISO BCC, consisting of a base station with M antennas
which simultaneously transmits K independent confidential messages to K spatially dispersed single-
antenna users. In this model, transmission takes place over a block fading channel, and the transmitted
signal is x = [x1, . . . , xM ]
T ∈ CM×1. The received signal at user k is given by
yk =
M∑
j=1
hk,jxj + nk (1)
where hk,j ∼ CN (0, 1) is the i.i.d. channel between the j-th transmit antenna element and the k-th
user, and nk ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the noise seen at the k-th receiver. The corresponding vector equation is
y = Hx + n (2)
where H = [h1, . . . ,hK ]
† is the K × M channel matrix. We assume that E [nnH ] = σ2I, define
ρ , 1/σ2, and impose the long-term power constraint E[‖x‖2] = 1.
It is required that the BS securely transmits each confidential message uk, ensuring that the unin-
tended users receive no information. This is performed at the secrecy rate Rs,k, defined as follows.
Let Pr(En) be the probability of error at the k-th intended user, m be a confidential message with
entropy H(m), ynk be the vector of all signals received by the eavesdroppers, and H(m|ynk ) be the
corresponding equivocation. Then a (weak) secrecy rate Rs,k for the intended user is achievable if
there exists a sequence of (2nRs,k , n) codes such that Pr(En)→ 0 and 1nH(m|ynk ) ≤ 1nH(m)− εn for
some sequence εn approaching zero as n→∞ [6].
In general, the behavior of the users cannot be determined by the BS. As a worst-case scenario, in our
system we assume that for each intended receiver k the remaining K−1 users can cooperate to jointly
eavesdrop on the message uk. For each user k, the alliance of the K − 1 cooperating eavesdroppers
is equivalent to a single eavesdropper with K − 1 receive antennas, which is denoted by k˜.
4B. Regularized Channel Inversion Precoding
In this paper, we consider linear precoding for the MISO BCC. Although suboptimal, linear pre-
coding schemes are of particular interest because of their low-complexity implementations [18], [19].
Linear precoding can control the amount of interference to maintain a high sum-rate in the broadcast
channel [20]–[25]. In the MISO BCC, linear precoding can be employed to control the amount of
interference and information leakage to the unintended receivers introduced by the transmission of
each confidential message [13]–[15]. We are interested primarily in the RCI precoder, because it gives
a better performance than the plain Channel Inversion precoder, particularly at low SNR [22].
In RCI precoding, the transmitted vector x is obtained at the BS by performing a linear processing
on the vector of confidential messages u = [u1, . . . , uK ]
T , whose entries are chosen independently,
satisfying E[|uk|2] = 1. We assume homogeneous users, i.e. each user experiences the same received
signal power on average, thus the model assumes that their distances from the transmitter are the same.
The transmitted signal x after RCI precoding can be written as x = Wu, where W = [w1, . . . ,wK ]
is the M ×K RCI precoding matrix [22], [23], given by
W =
1√
γ
HH
(
HHH +MξIK
)−1
=
1√
γ
(
HHH +MξIM
)−1
HH (3)
and γ = tr
{
HHH
(
HHH +MξIM
)−2} is a long-term power normalization constant. The function
of the real regularization parameter ξ is to achieve a tradeoff between the signal power at the intended
user and the interference and information leakage at the other unintended users for each message.
Note that unlike [14]–[17], we do not confine ourselves to nonnegative regularization parameters.
C. Achievable Secrecy Sum-Rates
A secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding in the MISO BCC was obtained in [14] by
considering that each user k, along with its own eavesdropper k˜ and the transmitter, forms an equivalent
multi-input, single-output, multi-eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap channel [6]. The transmitter, the
intended receiver, and the eavesdropper of each MISOME wiretap channel are equipped with M ,
1, and K − 1 virtual antennas, respectively. Due to the assumption of cooperating malicious users,
interference cancellation can be performed at k˜, which does not see any undesired signal term apart
5from the received noise. As a result, a secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding is given by [14]
Rs =
K∑
k=1
Rs,k =
K∑
k=1
[
log2
(
1 + SINRk
)
− log2
(
1 + SINRk˜
)]+
, (4)
where SINRk and SINRk˜ are the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios for the message uk at the
intended receiver k and the eavesdropper k˜, respectively, given by
SINRk =
ρ
∣∣hHk wk∣∣2
1 + ρ
∑
j 6=k |hHk wj|2
and SINRk˜ = ρ ‖Hkwk‖2 , (5)
where Hk is the matrix obtained from H by removing the k-th row.
III. LARGE SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the secrecy sum-rate of the RCI precoder in the large-system regime,
where both the number of receivers K and the number of transmit antennas M approach infinity, with
their ratio β = K/M being held constant. We then derive the optimal regularization parameter ξ that
maximizes the secrecy sum-rate and a closed-form approximation for the optimal network load β.
A. Deterministic Equivalent of the Secrecy Sum-Rate with RCI Precoding
In the following we provide a deterministic approximation of the per-antenna secrecy sum-rate, which
is almost surely exact as M →∞. To obtain such deterministic approximation, we need to ensure that
the minimum eigenvalue of
(
1
M
HHH + ξI
)
is bounded away from zero for all large M , almost surely.
Let C > 0,  > 0, we define the set DM = R\
{[
− (1 +√β)2 − C
M
1
2−
,− (1−√β)2 + C
M
1
2−
]}
.
Theorem 1: Let ρ > 0 and β > 0. Let Rs be the secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding
defined in (4). Then
sup
ξ∈DM
1
M
|Rs (ξ)−R◦s (ξ)| a.s.−→ 0, as M →∞. (6)
R◦s denotes the secrecy sum-rate in the large-system regime, given by
R◦s = K
log2 1 + g (β, ξ)
ρ+ ρξ
β
[1+g(β,ξ)]2
ρ+[1+g(β,ξ)]2
1 + ρ
(1+g(β,ξ))2

+
, for ξ 6= 0, (7)
with g (β, ξ) = 1
2
[
sgn(ξ) ·
√
(1−β)2
ξ2
+ 2(1+β)
ξ
+ 1 + 1−β
ξ
− 1
]
and
R◦s(0) = lim
ξ→0
R◦s(ξ) =

β log2
[
1 + (1−β)ρ
β
]
for β ≤ 1
β
{
log2
β3[β+ρ(β−1)]
[β2+ρ(β−1)2]2
}+
for β > 1
(8)
Proof: The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A.
6B. Secrecy Sum-Rate Maximizing Regularization Parameter
The value of ξ has a significant impact on the large-system secrecy sum-rate R◦s in (7). In the
following, we derive the regularization parameter ξ?◦ that maximizes R◦s .
Theorem 2: Let ρ > 0, β > 0. Let ξ?M = arg max
ξ∈DM
Rs(ξ) be the optimal regularization parameter in
DM , and denote R?s , Rs(ξ?M). Then
1
M
[R?s −R?s(ξ?◦)] a.s.−→ 0, as M →∞, (9)
where ξ?◦∈DM is the optimal large-system regularization parameter, given, for M large enough, by
ξ?◦ =
−2ρ2 (1− β)2 + 6ρβ + 2β2 − 2 [β (ρ+ 1)− ρ] ·√β2 [ρ2 + ρ+ 1]− β [2ρ (ρ− 1)] + ρ2
6ρ2 (β + 2) + 6ρβ
. (10)
Proof: The value of ξ?◦ can be found by setting the derivative of R◦s to zero and studying its
maxima in each of the intervals which compose the set DM . Then we have
0
a≤ 1
M
[R?s −Rs(ξ?◦)] =
1
M
[Rs(ξ
?
M)−R◦s(ξ?M) +R◦s(ξ?M)−R◦s(ξ?◦) +R◦s(ξ?◦)−Rs(ξ?◦)] (11)
b≤ 1
M
[Rs(ξ
?
M)−R◦s(ξ?M) +R◦s(ξ?◦)−Rs(ξ?◦)] c−→ 0, (12)
where (a), resp. (b), follows from the definition of ξ?M , resp. ξ
?◦, and (c) follows from Theorem 1.
When β = 1, the value of ξ?◦ in (10) reduces to the one derived in [14], given by ξ?◦ =(
3ρ+ 1 +
√
3ρ+ 1
)−1. We note that the value ξ?◦ that maximizes the secrecy sum-rate can be negative,
and it differs from the value ξ?◦ns = β/ρ that maximizes the sum-rate without secrecy requirements [16].
Unlike ξ?◦ns , which grows unbounded as ρ → 0, ξ?◦ is upper bounded by ξ?◦0 = limρ→0 ξ?◦ = 1 − β2 ,
∀β > 0, although when β ≥ 2 it can be shown that R◦s = 0 irrespective of ξ and ρ. Similarly to ξ?◦ns , the
value of ξ?◦ decreases as the SNR increases. In the high-SNR regime, we have limρ→∞ ξ?◦− ξ?◦∞ = 0,
where ξ?◦∞ approximates the high-SNR behavior of ξ
?◦ and is given by
ξ?◦∞ =

β
2ρ
for β < 1
1
3ρ
for β = 1
−2(β−1)2
3(β+2)
+ β(2−β)
2ρ(β+2)
for β > 1
(13)
We then have by the continuous mapping theorem
lim
ρ→∞
R?◦s −R?◦∞s
R?◦s
= 0, with R?◦s , R◦s (ξ?◦) and R?◦∞s , lim
ρ→∞
R◦s(ξ
?◦
∞). (14)
7C. Optimal Secrecy Sum-Rate
By substituting ξ?◦ from (10) in (7), it is possible to obtain the optimal secrecy sum-rate R?◦s
achievable by RCI precoding in the large-system regime. The secrecy sum-rate R?◦s is a function of
M , β and ρ. It was shown in [14] that for β = 1, R?◦s is always positive and monotonically increasing
with the SNR ρ. It can be shown that the same is true for β < 1. However when β > 1, the secrecy
sum-rate does not monotonically increase with ρ. It will be shown in Section IV that there is an
optimal value of the SNR beyond which the achievable secrecy sum-rate R?◦s starts decreasing, until
it becomes zero for large SNR. When β ≥ 2 no positive secrecy sum-rate is achievable at all.
These results can be explained as follows. In the worst-case scenario, the alliance of cooperating
eavesdroppers can cancel the interference, and its received SINR is the ratio between the signal leakage
and the thermal noise. In the limit of large SNR, the thermal noise vanishes, and the only means for
the transmitter to limit the eavesdropper’s SINR is by reducing the signal leakage to zero by inverting
the channel matrix. This can only be accomplished when the number of transmit antennas is larger
than or equal to the number of users, hence only if β ≤ 1. When β > 1 this is not possible, and
no positive secrecy sum-rate can be achieved. When β ≥ 2, the eavesdroppers are able to drive the
secrecy sum-rate to zero irrespective of ρ. This result is expected and consistent with the ones in [6].
Remark 1: In order for Theorem 1 to hold with ξ = ξ?◦, it is sufficient that ξ?◦ ∈ DM . Since ξ?◦
in (10) depends on β and ρ, so does the accuracy of R?◦s for finite M . We can distinguish the two
following cases. (i) When β 6= 1, we have ξ?◦ ∈ DM ∀ρ, and the approximation is accurate uniformly
on ρ. (ii) When β = 1, ξ?◦ ∈ DM for all finite ρ; if ρ → ∞, then it is required that M = O(ρ2+),
for some  > 0, otherwise the approximation gets weaker as ρ → ∞ for M fixed. This means for
instance that the approximation with M = 10 and ρ = 17dB is as accurate as the approximation with
M = 40 and ρ = 20dB.
D. Optimal Network Load
Fig. 1 depicts the per-antenna secrecy sum-rate R?◦s /M as a function of the network load β, for
several values of the SNR. We denote by β?◦ the value of β ∈ R+ that maximizes the per-antenna
secrecy sum-rate. It is possible to see from Fig. 1 that the value of β?◦ falls between 0 and 1, and
that it is an increasing function of the SNR. A closed-form approximation for β?◦ in the large-SNR
8regime is given in the following.
Proposition 1: In the limit of large SNR, the value β˜?◦ of the optimal network load can be found
by solving the following fixed point equation
β˜?◦ = ρ
(
1− β˜?◦
)
e
− 1
1−β˜?◦ , (15)
and the network load β˜?◦ tends to one for large SNR.
Proof: From (14), we have that R?◦∞s approximates R
?◦
s in the large-SNR regime. We then obtain
(15) by noticing that it must be β˜?◦ ∈ [0, 1], and by setting ∂(R?◦∞s /M)/∂β = 0.
E. Numerical Results
Fig. 2 compares the secrecy sum-rate R?◦s of the RCI precoder from the large-system analysis to
the simulated ergodic secrecy sum-rate Rs with a finite number of users, for different values of β.
The value of R?◦s was obtained by (7) with ξ
?◦ as in (10). The value of Rs was obtained by using the
regularization parameter that maximizes the average secrecy sum-rate. We observe that when β = 0.8
and when β = 1.2 the large-system analysis is accurate for all values of M and SNR. When β = 1,
the analysis is accurate at low SNR for all values of M , and for high SNR larger values of M are
required to increase the accuracy. The previous observations are consistent with Remark 1.
Fig. 3 shows that using the regularization parameter ξ?◦, obtained from large-system analysis, does
not cause a significant loss in the secrecy sum-rate compared to using ξ?M , optimized for each channel
realization. The figure shows the normalized secrecy sum-rate difference (R?s −Rs(ξ?◦)) /R?s , simulated
for finite-size systems, β = 0.8 and various values of the SNR. The value of R?s was obtained by
using ξ?M , whereas Rs(ξ
?◦) was obtained by using ξ?◦. We observe that the average normalized secrecy
sum-rate difference is less than 2% for all values of M and ρ. As a result, one can avoid the calculation
of ξ?M for every channel realization, and ξ
?◦ can be used with only a small loss of performance.
Fig. 4 shows the optimal number of users K? obtained via simulations, for M = 10, 20, and 40
antennas. This is compared to K?◦, obtained from an exhaustive search on the the large-system rate
R?◦s , and to the closed-form approximation K˜
?◦, obtained from (15) in the high-SNR regime. We note
that K?◦ is accurate across the whole range of SNR, whereas K˜?◦ is accurate for medium-to-large
values of the SNR.
9IV. RCI PRECODER WITH POWER REDUCTION
We have found that for β > 1 the RCI precoder performs poorly in the high-SNR regime. In this
section, we first derive the optimal value of the SNR ρ?◦ that maximizes the achievable secrecy sum-
rate R?◦s for β > 1. We then propose a linear precoder based on RCI and power reduction which
significantly increases the high-SNR secrecy sum-rate for 1 < β < 2.
A. Optimal Transmit SNR
When 1 < β < 2, there is an optimal value of the transmit SNR ρ?◦, provided in the following.
Proposition 2: The value of the SNR ρ?◦ that maximizes the secrecy sum-rate R?◦s for 1 < β < 2,
and the corresponding maximum value of R?◦s are respectively given by
ρ?◦ = arg max
ρ
R?◦s (ρ) =
β (2− β)
(β − 1)2 and R
?◦
s (ρ
?◦) = K log2
β2
4 (β − 1) . (16)
Proof: If 1 < β < 2, then ρ?◦ is the only stationary point of R?◦s , which can be found by setting
its derivative ∂R?◦s /∂ρ to zero. We note that limρ→ρ?◦ ξ
?◦ = 0. Therefore, R?◦s (ρ
?◦) can be obtained
by considering ρ→ ρ?◦ and ξ → 0 in (7) and after several algebraic manipulations.
B. Power Reduction Strategy
We now propose a power reduction strategy to prevent the secrecy sum-rate from decreasing at high
SNR, for 1 < β < 2. This is achieved by reducing the transmit power, and therefore reducing the SNR
to the value ρ?◦ that maximizes the secrecy sum-rate. We denote this scheme by the RCI precoder
with power reduction (RCI-PR), whose precoding matrix WPR is given by
WPR =

1√
γ
HH
(
HHH +MξIK
)−1
for β ≤ 1
1√
rγ
(
HHH +MξIM
)−1
HH for 1 < β < 2
0 for β ≥ 2
(17)
where r = max
(
ρ
ρ?◦ , 1
)
is the power reduction constant used for 1 < β < 2, and where ξ is chosen
from (10) evaluated with an SNR of min(ρ, ρ?◦). We note that (17) generalizes the RCI precoder in
(3) to the case when the power reduction strategy is employed.
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Remark 2: We note from (10) that ξ?◦(ρ?◦) = 0. Therefore when ρ ≥ ρ?◦, the optimal value of ξ
for the RCI-PR precoder is zero, and it reduces to a CI-PR precoder. Even if β > 1, it is still possible
to calculate WPR by expressing it as in (17) for 1 < β < 2.
We denote by R◦s,PR the large-system secrecy sum-rate achievable by the proposed RCI-PR precoder
(17). The following theorem provides a high-SNR approximation of R◦s,PR.
Theorem 3: In the high-SNR regime, we have limρ→∞
R◦s,PR−R◦∞s,PR
R◦s,PR
= 0, where R◦∞s,PR approximates
the large-system secrecy sum-rate R◦s,PR achieved by the RCI-PR precoder, and it is given by
R◦∞s,PR =

K log2
1−β
β
+K log2 ρ for β < 1
K
2
log2
27
64
+ K
2
log2 ρ for β = 1
K log2
β2
4(β−1) for 1 < β < 2
0 for β ≥ 2
(18)
Proof: When β ≤ 1, the RCI-PR precoder reduces to the optimal RCI precoder. Therefore, in
this case we have R◦∞s,PR = R
?◦∞
s , with the latter defined in (14). The value of (18) for 1 < β < 2 is
obtained by noting that for large SNR, RCI-PR forces ρ = ρ?◦, and by using Proposition 2. The value
for β ≥ 2 arises from the fact that no positive secrecy sum-rate is achievable in such a condition,
therefore the RCI-PR precoder (17) transmits zero power.
From (18) we can conclude that the behavior of our proposed RCI-PR precoder can be classified
into four regions. When β < 1, any secrecy sum-rate can be achieved, as long as the transmitter has
enough power available, and the secrecy sum-rate scales linearly with the factor K. When β = 1,
the linear scaling factor reduces to K/2. When 1 < β < 2, the cooperating eavesdroppers have more
antennas than the transmitter, and thus they can limit the achievable secrecy sum-rate regardless of
how much power is available at the transmitter. When β ≥ 2, the eavesdroppers are able to prevent
secret communications, and the secrecy sum-rate is zero even if unlimited power is available.
C. Numerical Results
Fig. 5 shows the simulated ergodic secrecy sum-rates with and without the power reduction strategy
for M = 10 transmit antennas and three values of β > 1. The figure shows that the proposed RCI-PR
precoder in (17) increases the secrecy sum-rate compared to the RCI precoder in (3). By using the
proposed power reduction strategy, it is possible to prevent the secrecy sum-rate from decreasing at
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large values of the SNR ρ. For large ρ, the achieved secrecy sum-rate equals the maximum across all
values of ρ. Moreover, this is achieved by using a lower transmit power, and the amount of power
saved equals 10 log10 r−1 dB.
V. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we first compare the secrecy sum-rate R?◦s,PR achieved by the proposed RCI-PR
precoder to the sum-rate R?◦ achieved by the optimized RCI precoder without secrecy requirements,
in the large-system regime. The gap between R?◦s,PR and R
?◦ represents the secrecy loss, i.e. how much
the secrecy requirements cost in terms of the achievable sum-rate. Furthermore, we compare the per-
user secrecy rate achieved by the proposed precoder to the secrecy capacity Cs,SU of a single-user
MISOME wiretap channel [6]. The gap between R?◦s,PR/K and Cs,SU represents a multi-user loss, i.e.
the loss due to the requirement of serving multiple users at the same time.
A. Secrecy Loss
The secrecy sum-rate R?◦s,PR is obtained by using the precoder in (17). The optimal sum-rate R
?◦
without secrecy requirements is obtained by using the precoder in (3), and it is given by [16]
R?◦ = K log2 [1 + g (β, ξ
?◦
ns )], (19)
with ξ?◦ns = β/ρ. Similarly to the secrecy sum-rate, there is an optimal value for the ratio β that
maximizes the per-antenna sum-rate R?◦/M without secrecy requirements [16], [17], [26]. It is easy
to show that R?◦ ≥ 0 for all values of β and ρ, with equality only for ρ = 0, and that R?◦ tends
to zero as β → ∞. Hence, there is no limit to the number of users per transmit antenna β that the
system can accommodate with a non-zero sum-rate. However if we impose the secrecy requirements,
the secrecy sum-rate R?◦s,PR is zero for β ≥ 2. Therefore, introducing the secrecy requirements will
limit the number of users that can be served with a non-zero rate to two times the number of transmit
antennas.
We now compare the secrecy sum-rate R?◦s,PR to the sum-rate R
?◦ in the limit of large SNR. Again
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by using the regularization parameter ξ?◦ns = β/ρ we obtain limρ→∞
R?◦−R?◦∞
R?◦ = 0, with
R?◦∞ =

K log2
1−β
β
+K log2 ρ for β < 1
K
2
log2 ρ for β = 1
K log2
β
β−1 for β > 1
(20)
By comparing (20) to (18), we can draw the following conclusions regarding the large-SNR regime.
If the number of transmit antennas M is larger than the number of users K, then R?◦∞s,PR = R
?◦∞
and the secrecy requirements do not decrease the sum-rate of the network. Therefore by using the
RCI-PR precoder in (17), one can achieve secrecy while maintaining the same sum-rate, i.e. there is
no secrecy loss. If M = K, then the secrecy loss is 1
2
log2(
64
27
) ≈ 0.62 bits per user, but the linear
scaling factor K/2 remains unchanged. Alternatively, one can achieve secrecy while maintaining the
same sum-rate, by increasing the transmit power by a factor 64/27 ≈ 3.75dB. If M < K < 2M ,
then the secrecy loss is (2− log2 β) bits per user, but the proposed precoder transmits a lower power,
which is always upper bounded by β(2−β)
(β−1)2 . Finally if K ≥ 2M , then the secrecy requirements force
the sum-rate to zero, whereas the sum-rate R?◦ remains positive, though it also tends to zero for large
β. We finally note that, when there is no secrecy constraint, user scheduling can be used to achieve
a higher multiplexing gain. This is not possible in the BCC, since discarding users does not prevent
them from eavesdropping.
B. Multi-User Loss
We now consider the multi-user loss, i.e. the loss due to the interference caused by the presence
of multiple users in the system. This is given by the gap between the per-user secrecy rate R?◦s,PR/K
achieved by the proposed RCI-PR precoder and the secrecy capacity Cs,SU of the MISOME wiretap
channel, where one user is served at a time and the remaining users can eavesdrop [6]. We compare
R?◦s,PR/K to Cs,SU in the large-SNR regime. The former is obtained from (18). The value of Cs,SU was
obtained in [6], and for large SNR we have limρ→∞
Cs,SU−C∞s,SU
Cs,SU
= 0, where
C∞s,SU =

log2 ρ for β < 1
1
2
log2 ρ for β = 1
log2
1
(β−1) for 1 < β < 2
0 for β ≥ 2
(21)
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We note that in Cs,SU from [6] a single-user system is considered. Therefore, only one message is
transmitted to one legitimate user, and the user does not experience any interference. By comparing
(21) to R?◦s,PR/K, we can conclude that the multi-user loss is log2
1−β
β
and 0.62 bits per user for β < 1
and β = 1, respectively. Hence for β ≤ 1, the proposed RCI-PR precoder achieves a per-user secrecy
rate which has the same linear scaling factor as the secrecy capacity of a single-user system with no
interference. When 1 < β < 2, the proposed precoder suffers a multi-user loss of (2− 2 log2 β) bits,
but again it has the advantage of transmitting a limited power.
C. Numerical Results
In Fig. 6 we compare the simulated per-user ergodic sum-rate Rs,PR/K of the RCI-PR precoder to
the sum-rate R/K of the RCI precoder without secrecy requirements. These were obtained by using
the regularization parameters ξ?◦ and ξ?◦ns , respectively. For β < 1, the difference between Rs,PR/K
and R/K becomes negligible at large SNR, and secrecy can be achieved without additional costs.
For β = 1, the two curves tend to have the same slope at large SNR, but there is a residual gap
between them. Therefore, secrecy can be achieved at a lower sum-rate. We note that in order to
achieve secrecy without decreasing the sum-rate, the required additional power is less than 4dB at
all SNRs. For 1 < β < 2, the sum-rate R tends to saturate for large SNR, and so does the secrecy
sum-rate Rs,PR. In the simulations, for β = 1.2 and ρ = 25dB, the gap is about 1.79 bits, close to
2− log2 β ≈ 1.74 bits. Moreover, we note that the proposed precoder saves 92% of the transmit power.
The gap is smaller for smaller values of the SNR, e.g. it reduces to about 0.72 bits when we set the
transmit power to 10dB.
Fig. 6 also shows the simulated secrecy capacity Cs,SU of the MISOME wiretap channel. For β ≤ 1,
the RCI-PR precoder achieves a per-user secrecy rate which has the same linear scaling factor as
Cs,SU. When 1 < β < 2, also Cs,SU saturates at high SNR. In particular, for β = 1.2 and ρ = 25dB,
the gap with the RCI-PR precoder is about 1.47 ≈ 2 − 2 log2 β bits, but the RCI-PR precoder saves
92% of the power. The gap is smaller for smaller values of the SNR, e.g. it reduces to about 0.4 bits
when we set the transmit power to 10dB. All these numerical results confirm the ones obtained from
the large-system analysis.
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VI. IMPERFECT CHANNEL STATE INFORMATION
In the previous sections, we proposed a linear precoder for the case when perfect CSI is available
at the transmitter. In this section, we consider a more realistic scenario where only an estimation of
the channel is available at the transmitter, and we obtain a deterministic equivalent for the secrecy
sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding. We then analyze the performance of our proposed RCI-PR
precoder, and we determine how the CSI estimation error must scale with the SNR and how many
feedback bits are required to maintain a given rate gap to the case with perfect CSI.
A. Secrecy Sum-Rates in the Presence of Channel Estimation Error
We model the relation between the channel H and the estimated channel Hˆ as H = Hˆ + E, where
the matrix E represents the channel estimation error, and it is independent from Hˆ. The entries of
Hˆ and E are i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variances 1− τ 2 and τ 2,
respectively. The value of τ ∈ [0, 1] depends on the quality and technique used for channel estimation,
and it is the same for all users. When τ = 0 the CSI is perfectly known, whereas τ = 1 corresponds
to the case when no CSI is available at all.
The transmitter uses the knowledge of Hˆ to obtain the RCI precoding matrix Wˆ, given by
Wˆ =
1√
γˆ
HˆH
(
HˆHˆH +MξI
)−1
=
1√
γˆ
(
HˆHHˆ +MξI
)−1
HˆH (22)
where γˆ = tr
{(
HˆHHˆ +MξI
)−2
HˆHHˆ
}
is the power normalization costant in the presence of CSI
error. A secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding in the presence of channel estimation error
with variance τ 2 is given by
Rˆs =
K∑
k=1
[
log2
(
1 + ˆSINRk
)
− log2
(
1 + ˆSINRk˜
)]+
, (23)
with
ˆSINRk =
ρ
∣∣hHk wˆk∣∣2
1 + ρ
∑
j 6=k |hHk wˆj|2
and ˆSINRk˜ = ρ ‖Hkwˆk‖2 . (24)
The deterministic equivalent of Rˆs in the presence of channel estimation error is given in the following.
Theorem 4: Let ρ > 0, β > 0, and ξ ∈ DM . Let Rˆs be the secrecy sum-rate in the presence of
channel estimation error with variance τ 2, defined in (23). Define ρ˜ , ρ(1−τ
2)
ρτ2+1
and ξ˜ , ξ
1−τ2 . Then
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1
M
(
Rˆs − Rˆ◦s
)
M→∞−→ 0 almost surely, where Rˆ◦s is the large-system secrecy sum-rate in the presence
of CSI error, given by
Rˆ◦s = K
log2 1 + g(β, ξ˜)
ρ˜+ ξ˜ρ˜
β [1+g(β,ξ˜)]
2
ρ˜+[1+g(β,ξ˜)]
2
1 + ρ
[
τ 2 + 1−τ
2
(1+g(β,ξ˜))
2
]

+
. (25)
Proof: The proof of Theorem 4 is provided in Appendix B.
B. Minimum Required CSI for the RCI-PR Precoder
We now consider our proposed RCI-PR precoder, and determine how the CSI estimation error must
scale with the SNR, to maintain a given rate gap to the case with perfect CSI. In the following, we
assume that the regularization parameter ξ?◦ from (10) is used. This does not require the transmitter
to be aware of the value of the distortion τ 2. We define the per-user gap ∆R◦s as the difference
∆R◦s ,
R?◦s,PR − Rˆ?◦s,PR
K
(26)
where R?◦s,PR and Rˆ
?◦
s,PR are the large-system secrecy sum-rates obtained by the RCI-PR precoder under
perfect CSI and under CSI distortion τ 2, respectively. We now derive the scaling of τ 2 required to
maintain a constant secrecy rate gap for high SNR, so that the multiplexing gain is not affected.
Proposition 3: For β ≤ 1, b > 1, a CSI distortion τ 2 = C
ρ
, with
C =

1
2
(√
4b− 3− 1) for β < 1
2
3
(√
3b− 2− 1) for β = 1 (27)
produces a high-SNR rate gap of log2 b bits.
Proof: For β ≤ 1, define
µ , τ 2ρ+ τ
4ρ(1 + g(β, ξ?◦))2
1− τ 2 +
τ 2(1 + g(β, ξ?◦))2
1− τ 2 . (28)
We have
lim
ρ→∞
∆R◦s =

lim
ρ→∞
log2
[
1 + β
2
4ρ(1−β)2µ
]
= log2 b for β < 1
lim
ρ→∞
log2
[
1 + 1
4
µ
]
= log2 b for β = 1
(29)
Proposition 4: For β > 1, if limρ→∞ τ 2 = 0, then the high-SNR rate gap is zero.
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Proof: For β > 1, defining
ν ,
[
τ 2ρ?◦ +
τ 4ρ?◦β2
(β − 1)2 (1− τ 2) +
τ 2β2
(β − 1)2 (1− τ 2)
]
(30)
we have
lim
ρ→∞
∆R◦s = lim
ρ→∞
log2
[
1 +
(
1− β
2
)
ν
]
= 0. (31)
We now consider the case of FDD systems. We assume that users quantize their channel directions
by using B bits and employing random vector quantization (RVQ), and that they feed the quantization
index back to the transmitter [27], [28]. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 5: In order to maintain a high-SNR secrecy rate offset of log2 b bits per-user in the
large-system regime and for all values of the network load β, it is sufficient to scale the number of
feedback bits B per user as B ≈ M−1
3
ρdB − (M − 1)
[
log2
(√
4b− 3− 1)− 1].
Proof: We note from Propositions 3 and 4 that τ 2 = C
ρ
ensures a gap of log2 b bits ∀β. If RVQ is
used, then the quantization error τ 2 can be upper bounded as τ 2 < 2−
B
M−1 [27]. Therefore, it is sufficient
to scale the number of feedback bits per user according to B = (M − 1) log2 ρ − (M − 1) log2C.
Substituting the smallest value of C from (27) and rewriting ρ in dB yields Proposition 5.
C. Numerical Results
Fig. 7 compares the secrecy sum-rate Rˆ?◦s of the RCI precoder from the large-system analysis to the
simulated ergodic secrecy sum-rate Rˆs for finite M , in the presence of a CSI error τ = 0.1 and for
different values of β. The values of Rˆ?◦s and Rˆs were obtained by (25) and (23), respectively, with
ξ = ξ?◦. As expected, the accuracy of the deterministic equivalent increases as M grows.
Fig. 8 shows the ergodic per-user secrecy rate Rˆs,PR/K, achieved by the proposed RCI-PR precoder
in the presence of a channel estimation error that scales: (i) as τ 2 = 0.1
ρ
for β > 1, and (ii) as in
Proposition 3 for β ≤ 1, with log2 b = 1 bit. This is compared to the ergodic rate Rs,PR/K, achieved by
the same precoder in the presence of perfect CSI (τ = 0). Three different values of β are considered,
and M = 10. For β ≤ 1, the simulations show a high-SNR gap of nearly 1 bit, whereas for β > 1 no
gap is present. These results confirm the claims made in Propositions 3 and 4.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered linear precoding for the MISO broadcast channel with confidential
messages. We first studied the RCI precoder in the large-system regime, and obtained a deterministic
equivalent for the achievable secrecy sum-rate, as well as expressions for the optimal regularization
parameter ξ and network load β. This analysis proved to be accurate even for finite-size systems.
We found that for β > 1 the RCI precoder performs poorly in the high-SNR regime. We therefore
proposed a linear precoder based on RCI and power reduction (RCI-PR) to increase the high-SNR
performance for network loads in the range 1 < β < 2. The proposed RCI-PR precoder was showed
to achieve a per-user secrecy rate with the same high-SNR scaling factor as both the following upper
bounds: (i) the sum-rate of the optimal RCI precoder in the absence of secrecy requirements, and
(ii) the secrecy capacity of a single-user system without interference. We further studied the case of
imperfect CSI, and we derived a deterministic equivalent for the secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI
precoding. We finally considered the performance of our proposed RCI-PR precoder in the presence
of CSI error, and determined: (i) how the CSI estimation error must scale with the SNR, and (ii) how
many feedback bits are required, in order to maintain a given rate gap to the case with perfect CSI.
The authors are currently working to study the effect of limited feedback on time division duplex
(TDD) systems, deriving the secrecy sum-rate as a function of the amount of channel training, as well
as the optimal amount of channel training that maximizes the secrecy sum-rate [29]. Moreover, the
authors are working to generalize the results present in this paper to the case where channel correlation
is present at the transmitter side, and to study how correlation affects the secrecy rates achievable by
RCI precoding [30].
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
By defining
Ak = h
H
k
(
HHk Hk +MξI
)−1
hk, (32)
Bk = h
H
k
(
HHk Hk +MξI
)−1
HHk Hk
(
HHk Hk +MξI
)−1
hk (33)
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we can rewrite the SINRs at the intended user and the eavesdropper as
SINRk =
ρA2k
γ (1 + Ak)
2 + ρBk
and SINRk˜ =
ρBk
γ (1 + Ak)
2 . (34)
We rewrite Ak = MK−1v
H
MQMvM , where
Qk,M =
(
1
K − 1H
H
k Hk − zI
)−1
∈ CM×M , vk,M = 1√
M
hk ∈ CM , z = − Mξ
K − 1 . (35)
By Bai and Silverstein’s Lemma [31]–[33], we have
E
[
φk
∣∣∣∣vHk,MQk,Mvk,M − 1M trQk,M
∣∣∣∣p] ≤ CpMp
(
M
λ¯M
) p
2
=
Cp
M
p
2 λ¯
p
2
M
= fM ∀p ≥ 1 (36)
where Cp is a constant depending only on p, φk = 1{|λ1(HHk Hk)−Mξ|,...,|λM (HHk Hk)−Mξ|>λ¯M}, with λ¯M →
0. Assume ξ ∈ D′M , with D′M = DM for β ≤ 1 and D′M = DM\
{[
− C
M
1
2−
,+ C
M
1
2−
]}
for β > 1.
Then we have M = O(λ¯−2−M ), for some  > 0, and min
k≤K
{φk} a.s.−→ 1 [33]. It follows from the Markov
inequality and the Borel-Cantelli lemma [34] that max
k
|vHk,MQk,Mvk,M− 1M trQk,M |
a.s.−→ 0, as M →∞.
The term 1
M
trQk,M is by definition the Stieltjes transform mHHk Hk,M (z) of H
H
k Hk,M . Similarly, it can
be shown that max
k
|mHHk Hk,M (z) − m(z)|
a.s.−→ 0, where m(z) can be obtained as the solution of
m(z) =
[
1− M
K−1 − z − z MK−1m(z)
]−1. This yields
Ak − g (β, ξ) a.s.→ 0 (37)
with
g (β, ξ) = β−1m(ξ) =
1
2
±
√
(1− β)2
ξ2
+
2 (1 + β)
ξ
+ 1 +
1− β
ξ
− 1
 , (38)
and where in order for m to be a Stieltjes transform, the sign of the square root must be chosen the
same as the sign of ξ [35].
We now rewrite Bk = Ak − M2ξ(K−1)2vHk,MQ2k,Mvk,M , and similarly we have
E
[
φk
∣∣∣∣vHk,MQ2k,Mvk,M − 1M trQ2k,M
∣∣∣∣p] ≤ CpMp
(
M
λ¯2M
) p
2
=
Cp
M
p
2 λ¯pM
= gM ∀p ≥ 1. (39)
Again, if M = O(λ¯−2−M ), for some  > 0, we have max
k
|vHk,MQ2k,Mvk,M − 1M trQ2k,M |
a.s.−→ 0, as
M →∞. We note that 1
M
trQ2k,M is the Stieltjes transform of Q
2
k,M , given by
1
M
trQ2k,M =
∫
dFM(λ)
(λRM − z)2
=
∂
∂z
∫
dFM(λ)
λRM − z
= m′RM (z) (40)
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where FM(λ) is the distribution of the eigenvalues of RM . Since both mRk,M (z) and m(z) are analytic
functions, we have max
k
|m′Rk,M (z)−m′(z)|
a.s.−→ 0, as M →∞, and it follows that
Bk −
[
1
β
m(z)− M
2ξ
(K − 1)2
∂
∂z
m(z)
]
= Bk −
[
g (β, ξ) + ξ
∂
∂ξ
g (β, ξ)
]
a.s.−→ 0. (41)
For the power normalization constant γ we have
γ = tr
{(
HHH +MξI
)−1}−Mξtr{(HHH +MξI)−2} = 1
β
mHHHM (z
′)− ξ
β2
m′HHHM (z
′) (42)
where z′ = −Mξ
K
. If ξ ∈ D′M , if follows that
γ −
[
g (β, ξ) + ξ
∂
∂ξ
g (β, ξ)
]
a.s.−→ 0. (43)
By the continuity of Rs and R◦s , it follows that the previous convergence results also hold for ξ ∈[
− C
M
1
2−
,+ C
M
1
2−
]
and β > 1. Equation (6) then follows from (4), (34), (37), (41), (43), and by
applying the continuous mapping theorem, the Markov inequality, and the Borel-Cantelli lemma.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
From [16], by defining ρ˜ 4=
ρ(1−τ2)
ρτ2+1
and ξ˜ 4= ξ
1−τ2 , a deterministic equivalent for ˆSINRk is given by
ˆSINR
◦
k = g(β, ξ˜)
ρ˜+ ξ˜ρ˜
β
[
1 + g(β, ξ˜)
]2
ρ˜+
[
1 + g(β, ξ˜)
]2 . (44)
By defining Ωk =
(
HˆHk Hˆk +MξI
)−1
, we can rewrite ˆSINRk˜ as
ˆSINRk˜ = ρ
Bˆk + 2
(
1 + Aˆk
)
Qk +
(
1 + Aˆk
)2
Rk
γˆ
(
1 + Aˆk
)2 , (45)
where
Aˆk = hˆ
H
k Ωkhˆk, Bˆk = hˆ
H
k ΩkHˆ
H
k HˆkΩkhˆk,
Qk = hˆ
H
k ΩkHˆ
H
k Hˆk
(
Ωk − Ωkhˆkhˆ
H
k Ωk
1 + Aˆk
)
ek, and
Rk = e
H
k
(
Ωk − Ωkhˆkhˆ
H
k Ωk
1 + Aˆk
)
HˆHk Hˆk
(
Ωk − Ωkhˆkhˆ
H
k Ωk
1 + Aˆk
)
ek.
If ξ ∈ DM , we have
Aˆk − g
(
β, ξ˜
)
a.s.−→ 0, Bˆk −
[
g
(
β, ξ˜
)
+ ξ˜
∂
∂ξ˜
g
(
β, ξ˜
)]
a.s.−→ 0, Qk a.s.−→ 0,
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Rk − τ
2
1− τ 2
[
g
(
β, ξ˜
)
+ ξ˜
∂
∂ξ˜
g
(
β, ξ˜
)]
a.s.−→ 0, and γˆ − 1
1− τ 2
[
g
(
β, ξ˜
)
+ ξ˜
∂
∂ξ˜
g
(
β, ξ˜
)]
a.s.−→ 0
hence a deterministic equivalent for ˆSINRk˜ is given by
ˆSINR
◦
k˜ = ρ
τ 2 + 1− τ 2(
1 + g(β, ξ˜)
)2
 . (46)
Theorem 4 then follows from (23), (44), (46), and from the continuous mapping theorem [34].
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Fig. 1. Asymptotic secrecy sum-rate per transmit antenna as a function of β for RCI precoding. The value of β?◦ is indicated next
to each curve.
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Fig. 2. Comparison between the secrecy sum-rate with RCI precoding in the large-system regime (7) and the simulated ergodic secrecy
sum-rate for finite M . Three sets of curves are shown, each one corresponds to a different value of β.
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Fig. 3. Mean normalized secrecy sum-rate difference between R?s (obtained using the optimal ξ?M ) and Rs(ξ
?◦) (obtained with ξ?◦
from large-system analysis), for β = 0.8 and various values of the SNR.
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Fig. 4. Comparison between K? (obtained via simulations), K?◦ (obtained via exhaustive search and large-system analysis), and the
closed-form approximation K˜?◦ (obtained via large-system and large-SNR analysis).
FIGURES 26
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
ρ [dB]
S
ec
re
cy
su
m
-r
a
te
 
 
Rs
Rs,PR
β = 1.2
β = 1.4
β = 1.6
Fig. 5. Comparison between the ergodic secrecy sum-rates Rs and Rs,PR achieved by the RCI precoder and by the proposed RCI-PR
precoder, respectively, for M = 10 transmit antennas. Three values of β are considered: 1.2, 1.4 and 1.6, corresponding to K = 12,
14 and 16 users.
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Fig. 6. Comparison between the simulated ergodic per-user secrecy rate with RCI-PR (solid) and the two upper bounds: (i) per-user rate
without secrecy requirements (dashed) and (ii) MISOME secrecy capacity (dotted), for K = 12 users. Three values of β are considered:
0.8, 1, and 1.2, corresponding to M = 15, 12 and 10 antennas.
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Fig. 7. Comparison between the per-antenna secrecy sum-rate Rˆ?◦s /M with RCI precoding in the large-system regime (25) and the
simulated ergodic secrecy sum-rate Rˆs/M , for finite M , and in the presence of a channel estimation error τ = 0.1. Three sets of curves
are shown, each one corresponds to a different value of β.
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Fig. 8. Comparison between the ergodic per-user secrecy rates Rs,PR and Rˆs,PR with RCI-PR precoder in the presence of perfect
CSI and in the presence of channel estimation error τ2, respectively. For β > 1, we used τ2 = 0.1
ρ
. For β ≤ 1, we used τ2 from
Proposition 3, with log2 b = 1 bit. Three sets of curves are shown for M = 10, each one corresponds to a different value of β.
